Following the proliferation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) between South countries, there has been concern that the formation of these agreements undermines e¤orts towards multilateral trade liberalization. To examine the static and dynamic implications of these agreements relative to other types, we construct a model with two North countries and two South countries, where the North and South are di¤erentiated by production cost. In particular, we look at the di¤erences in welfare across the various forms of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) and customs unions (CUs) and their implications for the stability of multilateral free trade. We show that tari¤ complementarity is strongest under a North-North FTA and weakest under a South-South CU, leading to highest world welfare for North-North PTAs. However, among FTAs, a South-South agreement is the only bilateral FTA that can sustain multilateral free trade under certain cost conditions, but otherwise may make multilateral free trade less likely than all other possible trade regimes. For CUs, free trade is easier to sustain under no agreement than a North-South or South-South CU, but may more likely under a North-North agreement. With multiple independent bilateral PTAs, mixed type agreements (North-South) make multilateral cooperation more likely to be sustainable than polarized agreements (North-North, South-South).
Introduction
Over the last six decades, countries have pursued trade liberalization along several fronts: unilaterally, preferentially with a few partner, and multilaterally within the General Agreement on Tari¤s and Trade (GATT), now subsumed by the World Trade Organization (WTO). The Article XXIV of the GATT permits WTO member countries to form preferential trade agreements (PTAs) such as free trade agreements (FTAs) and customs unions (CUs) under which members can grant tari¤ concessions to each other while they do not extend such concessions to other WTO members. As per the WTO's o¢ cial website, as of Jan. 2012, the WTO had received noti…cation of 511 such arrangements, of which 370 were noti…ed under Article XXIV. About 319 such agreements are already in force and most WTO members belong to multiple PTAs, and recently one can even observe major PTA groups in discussion with each other regarding mutual liberalization. While FTAs constitute an overwhelming majority of PTAs, the existing CUs involve some of the major economies of the world: for example, the Latin American CU MERCOSUR counts Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay as its members while the EC (27) -a CU that extends across both goods and servicescomprises of most major European economies. While the formation of PTAs has accelerated significantly, there has been little progress towards multilateral trade concessions in the last two decades. Further, many of the more recently signed agreements are between lower-income (South) partners, particularly among countries in Asia and Latin America. 1 This proliferation of South-South PTAs has posed an important concern to many in light of the trade diversion that is expected to occur under these agreements. 2 Given that the …rst Article of the GATT, the most favored nation (MFN) clause, is about non-discrimination and is at the heart of the WTO system (making the discriminatory nature of PTAs appear to be in direct con ‡ict with it), the existence of the Article XXIV has not been without controversy. 3 Another important exception to non-discrimination is the Enabling Clause that allows developed members to give di¤erential and more favorable treatment to developing countries. The Enabling Clause also provides a legal basis for PTAs among developing countries and for the Global System of Trade Preferences (GSTP). Bhagwati (1991) has forcefully argued forcefully that PTAs are fundamentally incompatible with the WTO's stated goal of multilateral 1 Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) , Ray (1998) , and Das and Ghosh (2006) contend that the majority of the PTAs have been formed between similar countries (so-called north-north agreements between developed countries and south-south agreements between developing countries) rather than between developed and developing countries (north-south agreements). 2 As noted in Demir and Dahi (2011) , South-South trade has become a substantial force in world trade. Between 1978 and 2005 the share of the South in world manufactures exports increased from 5% to 32%. The annual growth rate of real South-South manufactures exports has also been signi…cantly higher than the world average reaching 14% as opposed to 6% for the latter. Krishna and Mitra (2008) also points out that by the late 1980s there was a "rush to free trade" among countries in the developing world (see Rodrik, 1994) . 3 While the WTO sanctions PTAs, it does so only under certain conditions. In particular, Article XXIV requires that (1) a PTA should cover "substantially all trade" between members; (2) a PTA should result in signi…cant trade liberalization among members almost to the point that it leads to free trade amongst them; and (3) that PTA members not raise tari¤s on non-members -a condition that appears to be an attempt to safeguard the interests of those left outside such discriminatory trade agreements. Of course, these conditions do not succeed in fully protecting the interests of non-members. It is also not necessarily the case that PTAs satisfying these requirements are consistent with multilateral trade liberalization. trade liberalization and many researchers have questioned whether multilateral free trade is more likely to be achieved or the multilateral cooperation over free trade is more likely to be sustainable if the GATT allowed no exceptions to non-discriminatory trade liberalization. 4 The main questions we address in this paper concern the role of PTAs for the multilateral negotiations over free trade. First, in a variation of the oligopoly trade model of Brander and Krugman (1983) , we examine how di¤erent types of PTAs (North-North, South-South and North-South) a¤ect the static welfare of member and non-member countries and the world as a whole, among countries of di¤erent production e¢ ciency. 5 Then, using a model of in…nitely repeated interaction, we examine whether these arrangements make multilateral free trade more or less likely to be sustainable. For the most part we consider the role of single bilateral PTAs, but also consider the implications of multiple bilateral agreements for the likelihood of sustainability of multilateral free trade. As we show, there are signi…cant di¤erences in these implications depending on whether the PTA is a free trade agreement (FTA) or a customs union (CU). As in Saggi (2006) , we compare the static noncooperative (no agreement) national welfare maximizing tari¤s with those under various PTAs. To determine when multilateral free trade is easier or harder to sustain, we use the in…nite repetition of this static game, where cooperation is required to be self-enforcing as in Riezman (1991) , Bagwell and Staiger (1997a , 1997b , 1998 , 1999 , Bond et al. (2001) . As in these past models, countries balance the current bene…t of deviating from free trade against the future losses it su¤ers under the permanent trade war that results from its defection. In our setup, any initial agreement among countries (FTA or CU) is considered permanent in nature, so when countries deviate from free trade they revert back to their initial agreement (if any) in the trade war periods.
In the static framework, we show that North-North PTA leads to a larger reduction in the external tari¤s of member countries on non-member countries (greater tari¤ complementarity e¤ect), while a South-South PTA results in the smallest reduction. Comparing agreement types, FTAs result in larger external tari¤ reductions than CUs, which leads to non-member countries being better o¤ under FTAs but worse o¤ under CUs. While world welfare is always higher with a PTA than without, North-North PTAs yield the highest world welfare while South-South PTAs yield the lowest among agreements (due to substantial trade diversion), with stronger tari¤ complementarity under FTAs inducing higher welfare of FTAs relative to CUs of the same type (i.e. comparing a North-South FTA to a North-South CU).
The dynamic implications of PTAs on the sustainability of free trade lead to signi…cantly different results relative to the ones under the static framework. Underlying these di¤erences are two channels that we identify to help understand the intuition of the paper: the membership e¤ ect and the cost e¤ ect. The membership e¤ ect is de…ned as the impact of being a member of a PTA relative to being a non-member on the relative bene…t of defecting from free trade to the cost of defecting, holding the costs of all countries the same. In this way, the membership e¤ects isolates the role of PTA membership (that is, being a member or being a non-member) as if all countries in the model were symmetric. The cost e¤ ect instead isolates the role of cost di¤erences among countries on the bene…ts and costs of defection from free trade, holding membership status constant. As the impact on outside (non-member) countries radically di¤ers between FTAs and CUs, the membership e¤ect works in opposite directions across the agreement types. On the other hand, the cost e¤ect works in the same direction regardless of the agreement: high cost countries are less willing to cooperate over multilateral free trade. These two e¤ects combine to result in a dynamic ranking of FTAs that is the opposite of the static welfare ranking when the production e¢ ciency is moderately asymmetric: multilateral free trade is more likely to be sustainable under a South-South relative to all other agreements. Since the membership e¤ect works di¤erently for CUs, this reversal does not occur. We show that countries are most willing to cooperate over free trade under a North-North CU and least willing under a South-South CU. Finally, we …nd that with multiple bilateral agreements, global free trade is more likely when agreements are mixed (North-South) rather than polarized (North-North and South-South).
There are two key closely related papers to our line of research. In a similar static model, Das and Ghosh (2006) provides an endogenous FTA formation model that generates FTAs among similar countries. Unlike Das and Ghosh (2006) , we examine both FTAs and CUs and focus on the role of the formation of PTAs for the sustainability of the multilateral cooperation over free trade. Whereas Das and Ghosh (2006) di¤erentiates countries by market size, we employ di¤erences in production cost to separate the North countries from the South countries. Saggi (2006) develops a symmetric three country model to examine similar dynamic questions. However, the present paper develops a four-country model in an asymmetric world economy. The advantage of having a four-country set-up, as opposed to the standard three-country model, is that it can accommodate the division of world economy into more than one trade bloc at a time.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the static tari¤ game between three two sets of asymmetric countries, two lower cost 'North' countries and two higher cost 'South' countries. Here we consider no agreement, a bilateral FTA and a bilateral CU and compare equilibrium tari¤ and welfare levels. The next section introduces the dynamic game, an in…nite repetition of the static game and evaluates the incentives for countries to deviate from multilateral free trade under di¤erent PTAs relative to no agreement. In Section 4, we extend the model to incorporate multiple bilateral agreements and again investigate the incentives to deviate from global free trade. We o¤er our conclusions in Section 5.
The model
We develop a simple oligopoly model of trade between two regions: North and South. There are four countries: n, n 0 , s and s 0 . Countries n and n 0 are symmetric North countries while countries s and s 0 are symmetric South countries. 6 The regions are distinguished by the asymmetry in production costs: c s > c n where c s (c n ) denotes the marginal cost of production of South (North) …rms. 7 Two goods are produced in each country: x and y. Good x is produced by a single pro…t-maximizing …rm in each country at a constant marginal cost in terms of the numeraire good y that is produced under perfect competition with constant returns to scale. 8 For simplicity, we use the same notation for …rms as that of their corresponding countries.
Preferences over the two goods are assumed to be quasilinear:
where x i is the total output sold in country i: x i P j x ji and x ji denotes the output sold by country j's …rm in country i. Furthermore, u(x i ) is assumed to be quadratic so that the demand curve for good x is linear in each country:
In the absence of any PTAs, …rm j faces a speci…c tari¤ t ij when exporting to country i. Since Article I of the GATT forbids tari¤ discrimination, we restrict attention to the case where t ij = t i for all i and j. 9 Firm i's e¤ective marginal cost of exporting to country z, denoted by c iz , equals:
Firm j's pro…ts from exporting x ji to country i, denoted by ji , can be written as:
First order conditions (FOCs) for pro…t maximization for exporters are
Utilizing the demand function in (2) and the above FOCs can be solved for equilibrium outputs and pro…ts of all …rms:
The following comparative statics are standard:
7 For simplicity, …xed costs and transportation costs are assumed to be zero. 8 The gains from trade stem from reduced market power in the domestic industry. To this end, the monopoly assumption is not crucial but is the simplest way to represent market power. 9 It is obvious that tii = 0 for all i since countries do not impose taxes on their local …rms and there are no tari¤s on the numeraire good (that may be traded internationally in order to balance trade).
In other words, country i's tari¤ lowers exports to its market (x zi ); increases the sales of its local …rm (x ii ); and lowers the total output sold (x i ) in its market.
Welfare of country i is de…ned as the sum of its domestic surplus and total export pro…ts:
where iz = (p i c iz )x iz denotes …rm i's export pro…t in country z and t is the global tari¤ vector t = (t s ; t s 0 ; t n ; t n 0 ). Domestic surplus S i (t i ) is de…ned as:
where u(x i ) p i x i is consumer surplus in country i; ii = (p i c i )x ii equals …rm i's pro…ts in its own market; and t i X z6 =i
x zi is tari¤ revenue of country i.
Static tari¤ game
As in Brander and Krugman (1983) , in our model, each country has a unilateral incentive to impose rent extracting tari¤s on those trading partners with whom it does not have any trade agreement.
Since markets are segmented and marginal costs are constant, strategic independence of trade policies obtains and own tari¤s do not a¤ect export pro…ts. Let t r i denote the optimum tari¤ imposed by country i and w i (r) denote the equilibrium welfare of country i under trade regime r.
No agreement
Under no agreement f g, to maximize their welfare, all countries simultaneously choose their respective non-discriminatory (MFN) tari¤s. Given the market segmentation, country i's optimal MFN tari¤ choice problem reduces to the maximization of its domestic surplus:
For simplicity, without loss of generality, we assume that the following holds hereafter: c s = c > c n = 0. The following optimal tari¤s obtain under no agreement h i:
Preferential trade agreements
Given that our objective is to examine the static and dynamic implications of di¤erent forms of PTAs, we allow single bilateral PTAs only. 10 Therefore, beside f g, the following trade policy regimes can arise: (i) North-North PTA fnn 0 g; (ii) South-South PTA fss 0 g; (iii) North-South PTA fnsg. In order to di¤erentiate CUs from FTAs, we use a superscript u for CU, i.e. while fnn 0u g denotes North-North CU, fnn 0 g denotes North-North FTA.
Free trade agreements
Suppose countries i and j enter into an FTA fijg under which they impose zero tari¤s on each other: t ij = t ji = 0. Under fijg, member country i solves
where t z is a vector of tari¤s member countries'…rms face in non-member countries'markets while t i denotes the external tari¤ country i imposes on the imports from non-member countries. The following optimal tari¤s obtain:
; t ss s = + 2c 8 ; t ns n = 6 + 7c 48 and t ns s = 6 13c 48 (13) We show in the appendix that we have to impose a restriction on the degree of cost asymmetry in order to guarantee market access of south …rms in export markets: c c f = 3 19 . 11
Customs unions
As per Article XXIV of the GATT, when countries form a CU (say fij u g), we assume that they eliminate the internal tari¤s on each other (t ij = t ji = 0) and impose common external tari¤ (t i (ij u ) = t j (ij u ) = t ij u ) on the non-member countries. As a result, due to the market segmentation, member countries (i and j) solve the following problem:
where t z is a vector of tari¤s member countries'…rms face in non-member countries'markets while t ij u denotes the common external tari¤ member countries impose on the imports from non-member countries. The following optimal tari¤s obtain under CUs:
; t ss 0u = 4 and t ns u = 2 c 8
where z = n; s
where z = s, n. Note that export of south …rms under all CU regimes is non-negative i¤ c c u = 2 21 holds. Since c u < c f holds, in order to guarantee market access of south …rms under any trade regime, we assume that c < c u holds hereafter. In order to minimize the potential harmful e¤ects of PTAs, Article XXIV of the GATT requires that member countries not raise tari¤s (or any other trade restrictions) on non-members. In our model as in Staiger (1997a, 1999) , we …nd that this requirement is not binding since the formation of a bilateral PTA induces each member to lower its tari¤ on the non-member country relative to the status quo (i.e. the model exhibits tari¤ complementarity). 12 The intuition can be explained as follows: when PTA members reduce their tari¤ on each other to zero, exports of the 1 1 The complete derivation and formulae we do not report in the text can be found in the appendix. 1 2 World Bank (2005) argues that no clear evidence shows that the formation of a PTA leads member countries to become more protectionist towards non-member countries. Magee non-member countries decrease and thus they become a less important rent-extracting source. We denote the tari¤ complementarity e¤ect realized under an FTA fijg and under a CU fij u g in a member country i by i (ij) = t i t ij i > 0 and i (ij u ) = t i t ij u > 0, respectively. We can directly state the following result that is immediate from the tari¤s reported above:
Proposition 1 The tari¤ complementarity e¤ ect is larger under an FTA relative to a CU of the same type: i (ij) > i (ij u ) and the formation of a N orth N orth ( South South) PTA leads to the largest (smallest) external tari¤ reduction relative to no agreement.
The intuition behind the …rst part of the above proposition is as follows. Unlike an FTA, a CU takes into account the export pro…ts that members derive from each other's markets and thus members impose higher external tari¤s on non-members under a CU relative to an FTA of the same type. The second part of the proposition argues that the tari¤ complementarity e¤ ect decreases (increases) in the average cost of the member (non-member) countries. Intuitively, when the member countries of a PTA are more e¢ cient than the non-member countries, the non-members' exports to member countries fall relatively more, further reducing the protection incentives of the member countries. Consequently, since the average cost of the member countries is the lowest, a North-North PTA yields the largest tari¤ complementarity e¤ect while the opposite is true for a South-South PTA. Next, we focus on welfare:
Proposition 2 While member countries are better o¤ under any PTA relative to no agreement, non-member countries are better o¤ under FTAs and worse o¤ under CUs relative to no agreement. Aggregate world welfare under a PTA is always larger relative to that under no agreement while North-North PTA (South-South PTA) yields the highest (lowest) world welfare.
From each country's perspective, a PTA embodies the following trade-o¤. On the one hand, forming a PTA lowers a member country's domestic surplus relative to the case where it can use its optimally chosen tari¤(s). On the other hand, being part of a PTA increases export pro…ts in other member's market. We show in the appendix that, when c c u holds, the latter e¤ect dominates the former so that countries always have an incentive to form a PTA. Furthermore, we can make two immediate points for non-member countries: (i) due to market segmentation, a PTA does not alter the domestic surplus of a non-member country and (ii) quantity competition in the product market implies that equilibrium export pro…ts are directly related with the total exports. Since the non-member countries'exports increase when the other countries form an FTA, their welfare levels increase relative to the no agreement. On the other hand, non-member countries' exports decrease when the other countries form a CU as the tari¤ complementarity is not large enough to o¤set the discrimination they face relative to member countries and their welfare decreases relative to no agreement. 13 This result implies that the PTAs can have harmful e¤ects on the non-member countries unless they are accompanied by su¢ cient external tari¤ reductions. The second part of the above proposition argues that, since North-North PTA leads to larger trade creation and smaller trade diversion relative to a South-South PTA (and North-South PTA), world welfare follows the same ranking as that of the tari¤ complementarity e¤ects.
The above proposition does not speak about the welfare of member countries under FTAs relative to CUs of the same type. When a PTA involves symmetric countries, member countries are better o¤ under a CU relative to an FTA of the same type. This stems from the fact that, unlike an FTA, a CU takes into account the export pro…ts that members derive from each others' markets in joint welfare maximization. Thus, we obtain w n (nn 0u ) > w n (nn 0 ) and w s (ss 0u ) > w s (ss 0 ) for all c
However, when a PTA involves asymmetric members (such as North-South PTA), while common external tari¤ setting always bene…ts the north member, it harms the south member country if it is su¢ ciently high cost:
where c ns s < c u holds. So far, since we have not allowed for multilateral tari¤ reductions, the only way to achieve tari¤ levels lower than the one under the no agreement is via bilateral PTAs. Next we examine the following question: how does bilateral trade liberalization (via an FTA or a CU) a¤ect incentives for multilateral tari¤ cooperation over free trade?
Multilateral cooperation over free trade
Similar to the existing literature, multilateral tari¤ cooperation over free trade is modeled as a stationary repeated game where cooperation can be sustained only if it is incentive compatible for all countries. 14 In previous models, cooperation is self-enforcing in the sense that each country balances the current bene…t of deviating from free trade against the future losses caused by the breakdown of multilateral cooperation that results from its defection. We assume that countries sustain cooperation via trigger strategies and defection by any country results in a multilateral trade war. It is useful to note an important di¤erence between no agreement and PTAs. By assumption, PTAs are permanent in nature so that member countries of a PTA retain zero tari¤s on each other even if cooperation with non-member countries breaks down. On the other hand, countries revert to optimally chosen individual MFN tari¤s in the absence of PTAs.
Cooperation under no agreement
Suppose that each country employs zero tari¤ until any one of them defects. Once defection happens, countries switch back to their optimally chosen individual MFN tari¤s. Let W i (t = 0) denote the per period welfare of country i under cooperation:
where S i (t i = 0) is the domestic surplus and P z6 =i iz (t z = 0) equals the total exporting pro…t of country i under free trade. Next, we de…ne the welfare of country i that defects from zero tari¤ to its optimal MFN tari¤ under no agreement (t i ) while other countries cooperate:
Note that since markets are strategically separated from each other, defection from free trade to t i does not a¤ect the total export pro…ts of country i whereas it increases its domestic surplus from S i (t i = 0) to S i (t i ). Since defection by any country leads to a permanent multilateral trade war where all countries impose their optimally chosen individual MFN tari¤s, welfare levels under trade war (No agreement) are as follows:
where t denotes the vector of optimally chosen tari¤s by all countries while t z excludes t i from t . Using the expressions in (18), (19) and (20), we are able to de…ne one period bene…t and cost of defection for countries. First, we de…ne the bene…t from the defection:
Similarly, per period cost of defection to a country is given by 15
In order for tari¤ cooperation to be self-enforcing, the one period bene…t from defection must be less than the discounted lifetime cost of defection since defection leads to permanent multilateral trade war. In other words, the incentive compatibility (IC) constraint must hold for each country as follows:
where denotes the discount factor and 1 C i (t ) measures the trade war's life-time cost of defection to each country under f g. For each country, the critical discount factor i above which cooperation over free trade is self-enforcing obtains when B i (t i ) = 1 C i (t ) holds.
Next, we examine the nature of per period bene…t and cost of defection from the perspective of South and North countries. Before proceeding, it is important to note that countries'incentives for cooperation di¤er across the regions because of the underlying di¤erences in production costs. To this end, the following lemma summarizes how the bene…t and cost of defection from tari¤ cooperation under no agreement changes with the own and other countries'costs of production.
Lemma 1 Let z 6 = i. Then, (i)
> 0. The intuition behind the …rst part of the above lemma has to do with the fact that tari¤s are used to extract rents in the model: since demand is symmetric across countries, any given reduction in imports decreases consumer welfare in a roughly equal way in all countries whereas it results in a greater increase in domestic …rm's local pro…ts in lower cost countries due to higher mark-ups. Thus, the bene…t from defection rises as a country becomes more e¢ cient. Similarly, when the rival countries become more e¢ cient, the incentive to extract rent increases and thus the bene…t from defection rises.
The intuition for the second part can be explained as follows. Due to the smaller volume of exports, countries with higher costs of production bene…t less from tari¤ reductions granted by others. Similarly, such countries have relatively more to lose from eliminating their own optimal tari¤s since they apply to relatively larger import volumes. Thus, the cost of defection from tari¤ cooperation of a country depends negatively on its own cost. Finally, the higher the cost of the other countries, the larger the increase in export pro…ts due to the tari¤ cooperation over free trade, and the smaller the loss due to its own trade liberalization since tari¤ reduction applies to smaller volume of imports (due to higher cost of the other countries). Therefore, the cost of defection falls when other countries become more e¢ cient. Since the bene…t from defection rises while the cost of defection falls when the other countries become more e¢ cient, the following proposition is immediate:
Proposition 3 Under f g, the range of discount factors above which north country is willing to cooperate over free trade is larger than that above which south countries are willing to cooperate: [Insert Figure 1 here]
The above proposition informs us that the higher the production cost of a country, the less willing it is to cooperate multilaterally over free trade. Therefore, under no agreement, the critical discount factor above which south countries are willing to cooperate over free trade binds for the sustainability of multilateral cooperation over free trade.
Next, consider how the formation of PTAs of di¤erent types changes the incentives for multilateral cooperation over tari¤s.
Cooperation under PTAs
Suppose two countries sign a binding PTA and eliminate tari¤s on each other. As mentioned above, we assume that countries are bound to their PTAs, implying that member countries retain zero tari¤s on each other even when the multilateral cooperation breaks down. How does the formation of a PTA fijg if it is an FTA or fijg u if it is a CU) alter the costs and bene…ts of multilateral tari¤ cooperation for member and nonmember countries? To address this question, …rst consider the perspective of the non-member countries.
Cooperation incentives of non-members under PTAs
It is straightforward to argue that when countries cooperate over free trade, the per period welfare of a nonmember country under free trade and in the defection period (thus the bene…t of defection from cooperation for the non-member country) stays the same under a PTA as under f g. After the breakdown of cooperation, a non-member country (say country k) responds via raising its tari¤ from zero to t k as under f g from next period on, but faces t z in the other non-member country z and t ij i and t ij j in member countries'markets under an FTA (t ij u i and t ij u j under a CU). Since the bene…t from the defection of a non-member country under a PTA is the same as the one under no agreement, it behaves the same way as outlined in Lemma 1:
< 0, where z 6 = k and r = fijg; fijg u . However, for a non-member country, the formation of a PTA yields a reinforcing e¤ect on the cost of defection. The lower the cost of the member countries, the larger the tari¤ complementarity e¤ect under a PTA the non-member country enjoys. Thus, cost of defection from cooperation falls as member countries become more e¢ cient:
@c i > 0, where r = fijg; fij u g. Then the following ranking is immediate: The above ranking provides support for the idea that the lower the cost of member countries of a PTA, the less willing the non-member countries to cooperate over free trade. Similarly, when nonmember countries are asymmetric (as under a North-South PTA), the south non-member country's incentive to cooperate is lower than that of the north non-member country. Note that the critical discount factors for the non-member countries follow the same ranking of the tari¤ complementarity e¤ects of PTAs (see Proposition 1).
Next, we compare the incentives of non-member countries under a PTA relative to no agreement. It is immediate from the second part of the proposition 2 that a non-member country is better (worse) o¤ under an FTA (a CU) relative to no agreement. Thus, the following is immediate:
Proposition 4 The per period cost to a non-member country of the breakdown of cooperation is smaller (greater) under an FTA (a CU) relative to that under f g while the bene…t of defection stays the same. Therefore, an FTA (a CU) makes non-member countries less (more) willing to cooperate multilaterally over free trade: (i) nn 0 s > s > nn 0u s ; (ii) ns s 0 > s > ns u s 0 ; (iii) ns n 0 > n > ns u n 0 and (iv) ss 0 n > n > ss 0u n . Combining the ranking in (23) and Proposition 4, we can summarize the ranking structure of critical discount factors: nn 0 s ns s 0 s and s > nn 0u s ns u s 0 . The results so far speak out for the sustainability of multilateral cooperation over free trade only from non-member countries'perspectives. Since the incentive constraint of the least willing participant determines the sustainability of multilateral free trade, we can argue by focusing on non-member countries that if multilateral free trade cannot be supported under no agreement ( < s ), it can never be sustained under the North-North FTA and North-South FTA as well (the formation of these agreements hinders multilateral tari¤ cooperation). Unlike bilateral FTAs, non-member countries under CUs of the same type have stronger incentives to cooperate relative to no agreement. In order to see the full picture, we have to consider the incentives of member countries for multilateral tari¤ cooperation under PTAs. To this end, we examine FTAs and CUs in isolation.
Cooperation incentives of FTA members
Under multilateral tari¤ cooperation over free trade, the per period welfare of a member country (say i) under fijg equals
Since an FTA is permanent by assumption, in the defection period and under permanent trade war thereafter, the FTA member i raises its tari¤ (from zero to t ij i ) only on non-member countries. Thus, a member country's welfare in the period of defection equals
while the per period welfare of a member country under a trade war equals
An FTA member's bene…t from defection equals the increase in domestic surplus due to the ability to raise its tari¤ from zero to t ij i :
When a member country i defects from cooperation, from next period on, it faces t z in nonmembers'markets while the other FTA member j raises its tari¤ on non-members from zero to t ij j . Then, a member's per period cost of defection equals
In order to examine a member country's bene…t and cost of defection from multilateral cooperation over free trade under an FTA hfijgi, we distinguish two distinct e¤ects. On one hand, relative to no agreement, the inability of a member country i to raise its tari¤ on its FTA partner j reduces the bene…t from defection. Then, it is immediate to argue from (28) that the …rst component of the cost of defection ( B ij i (t ij i )) increases. On the other hand, in the punishment phase (under a permanent trade war) while all countries su¤er from the tari¤ increase under no agreement, a member country under an FTA partially bene…ts due to the tari¤ increase in its partner's market since it applies only to non-member countries. The following lemma summarizes how the formation of an FTA alters the costs and bene…ts of multilateral tari¤ cooperation for member countries.
Lemma 2 Let z 6 = i; j denotes the non-member country under an FTA hfijgi. Then, the following obtains: (i)
The above lemma implies two noteworthy results: (i) since
hold, if member countries are asymmetric, the one with a higher cost is less willing to cooperate relative to its FTA partner (with a lower cost) and (ii) since
hold, member countries are more willing to cooperate as the non-member countries become less e¢ cient. Therefore, we obtain the following ranking: 
Sustainability of multilateral free trade under FTAs
Sustainability hinges on the discount factor of the country that is least willing remain in the agreement. To this end, we identify two distinct e¤ects that arise upon the formation of an FTA: the membership e¤ ect and the cost e¤ ect. First, we isolate the former e¤ect by assuming that all countries are symmetric with respect to cost of production (c = 0). Under such a case, while both the bene…t and cost of defection for members are lower (countries i and j) relative to that of non-members, the di¤erence in the cost of defection is relatively smaller:
and
Thus, when countries are symmetric, non-member countries are less willing to cooperate relative to member countries: ij z > ij i = ij j , where z 6 = i; j and this e¤ect is called as the membership e¤ ect. We also know from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 (and the subsequent discussions) that the higher the cost of a country the less willing it is to multilaterally cooperate over free trade and this is called the cost e¤ ect, which becomes stronger as the cost asymmetry gets larger. As represented in …gure 2a, since these two e¤ects reinforce each other under fnn 0 g, the south non-member countries' incentive is binding for the sustainability of multilateral cooperation.
Proposition 5a Under fnn 0 g, multilateral cooperation over free trade is sustainable if and only if nn 0 s .
[Insert Figure 2a]
Similarly, under North-South agreement fnsg, both the membership e¤ ect and the cost e¤ ect work in the same direction for the south non-member country which, as the least willing country, determines the critical discount factor. Here it is worth mentioning that cost e¤ ect dominates the membership e¤ ect for the south member country relative to the north non-member country and thus we obtain (see Figure 2b ): [Insert Figure 2b] Finally, consider South-South agreement fss 0 g. We …nd that cost e¤ect dominates the membership e¤ect if and only if south countries are su¢ ciently high cost: ss 0 s ss 0 n if and only if c c ss 0 (see Figure 2c ). In other words, when countries are relatively symmetric, the north non-member country's incentive is pivotal for multilateral cooperation but the south member countries'incentives determine the critical discount factor when they are su¢ ciently high cost. Thus, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 5c Under fss 0 g, multilateral cooperation over free trade is sustainable if and only if > max( ss 0 s ; ss 0 n ) where ss 0 s ss 0 n i¤ c c ss 0 .
[Insert Figure 2c ]
Next, we compare the range of discount factors above which multilateral cooperation over free trade is sustainable under di¤erent types of FTAs. Before proceeding, let c(r v) denote the cost threshold at which the critical discount factors under FTAs r and v are equal. Combining (23), Proposition 5a, Proposition 5b, and Proposition 5c, we can state our main result in the FTA context (see Figure 5 ):
Proposition 6 While the range of discount factors above which multilateral cooperation over free trade is sustainable is larger under fnsg relative to fnn 0 g for all c: [Insert Figure 3 ] The …rst part of the above proposition is immediate from (23) and it argues in favor of the idea that while aggregate world welfare is higher under fnn 0 g relative to fnsg statically, multilateral free trade is easier to sustain under fnsg relative to fnn 0 g. The primary reason for this result is that the non-member south country is less willing to cooperate as average e¢ ciency of FTA members rises since the tari¤ complementarity e¤ect (thus the free rider e¤ect) is larger under fnn 0 g relative to fnsg. Thus, the external trade liberalization of FTA members itself reduces the incentives of non-members for multilateral trade liberalization making multilateral cooperation less likely to be sustainable.
The second part of the above proposition informs us that when south countries are su¢ ciently low cost (c < c(ns ss 0 )), multilateral free trade is easier to sustain under fss 0 g relative to other types of FTAs. To understand the intuition, note that since c ss 0 < c(ns ss 0 ) holds we have to consider two cost ranges: (i) ss 0 s < ss 0 n when c < c ss 0 and (ii) ss 0 s > ss 0 n when c(ns ss 0 ) > c > c ss 0 . Suppose …rst that c < c ss 0 holds and ss 0 n is the critical discount factor under fss 0 g. It is immediate from (23) that ss 0 n < ns s 0 (thus ss 0 n < nn 0 s ) holds since (i) country n is more e¢ cient relative to country s 0 and (ii) average cost of members is lower under fss 0 g relative to fnsg. Consider now that c(ns ss 0 ) > c > c ss 0 holds and ss 0 s is the critical discount factor under fss 0 g. Over this range, both the bene…t and cost of defection of country s under fss 0 g is lower than the ones of country s 0 under fnsg and the di¤erence in costs is smaller relative to the di¤erence in bene…ts. Thus, cooperation is easier to sustain under fss 0 g relative to fnsg and (thus relative to fnn 0 g). On the other hand, as c rises, the south member countries'cost of defection under fss 0 g falls more rapidly relative to the south non-member country under fnsg and fnn 0 g and thus we obtain that the critical discount factor under fss 0 g exceeds the one under fnsg when c is su¢ ciently high: c c(ns ss 0 ). Similar argument applies for the comparison of ss 0 s and nn 0 s . As a result, when countries are relatively symmetric, multilateral cooperation over free trade is easier to sustain under fss 0 g relative to other types of FTAs. Under such a case, it is important to note that the critical discount factors under di¤erent FTAs follow the same ranking as of the aggregate world welfare. In other words, positive dynamic implications comes at the expense of a static welfare loss. However, when south countries are su¢ ciently high cost, the opposite result obtains and the static and dynamic implications become aligned.
Comparison of FTAs with no Agreement
So far we have examined the sustainability of multilateral cooperation over free trade under di¤erent types of FTAs. Next, we ask whether the formation of FTAs hinders or facilitates multilateral cooperation relative to no agreement. We know from Proposition 4 and Proposition 6 that fnsg and fnn 0 g raise the critical discount factor above which multilateral cooperation over free trade is sustainable relative to no agreement: nn 0 s ns s 0 > s . What remains is the comparison of s and max( ss 0 s ; ss 0 n ). Proposition 7 While multilateral cooperation over free trade is easier to sustain under f g relative to fnsg and fnn 0 g for all cost levels, it is harder to sustain under f g relative to fss 0 g when c( ss 0 ) c c( ss 0 ) holds.
[Insert Figure 4]
There has been widespread concern regarding that the formation of South-South trade agreements undermines multilateral trade liberalization e¤orts. However, the above proposition informs us that South-South FTA is the only bilateral FTA that can facilitate multilateral cooperation when the degree of cost asymmetry across countries is at a medium range (see Figure 4 ). It is crucial to note that when south countries are su¢ ciently high cost multilateral free trade is less likely to be sustainable under South-South FTA relative to all other possible trade regimes.
We next consider the incentives of CU members for multilateral cooperation.
Cooperation incentives of CU members
As before, under multilateral tari¤ cooperation over free trade, the per period welfare of a member country (say i) under fij u g equals
Like FTAs, a CU (say fij u g) is assumed to be a permanent agreement so that both in the defection period and under permanent trade war members impose zero tari¤s on each other and t ij u on the non-member countries. Here, it is important to note that, unlike an FTA, the defection of CUs from multilateral cooperation involves both members due to the requirement of common external tari¤ under CUs. Thus, a member country's welfare in the period of defection equals
A CU member's bene…t from defection equals the increase in (i) domestic surplus due to the ability to raise its tari¤ from zero to t ij U i and (ii) export pro…ts in CU partner's market since t ij u applies to non-member countries only:
Note that the second e¤ect does not arise under an FTA since the defection of CUs from multilateral cooperation involves both members unlike FTAs. Thus, a member's bene…t from defection under a CU is always larger relative to that under an FTA of the same type:
When a member i defects from cooperation, from next period on, it faces t z in non-members' markets while the CU's tari¤ on non-members stays the same as t ij u . Then, a CU member's per period cost of defection equals
It is immediate from (16) that cost of defection of member countries under fnn 0u g and fss 0u g is smaller relative to the one under fnn 0 g and fss 0 g. Moreover, we know from (17) that while the north member's cost of defection under fns u g is always lower relative to fnsg, the opposite obtains for the south member only when it is su¢ ciently high cost. The following proposition states that, over that range, the bene…t e¤ect dominates the cost e¤ect for the south member country under fns u g relative to fnsg:
Proposition 8 Member countries have weaker incentive to cooperate multilaterally over free trade under a CU relative to an FTA of the same type: (i) nn 0u n > nn 0 n ; (ii) ss 0u s > ss 0 s ; (iii) ns u n > ns n and (iv) ns u s > ns s . The above proposition along with Proposition 4 argues in favor of the idea that the range of discount factors for which a member (non-member) country is willing to cooperate over multilateral free trade is smaller (larger) under a CU than that under an FTA of the same type. Next, we examine the critical discount factors under di¤erent types of CUs
Sustainability of multilateral free trade under CUs
As under FTAs, we focus on the least willing country's incentive that determines the critical discount factor over which multilateral tari¤ cooperation is sustainable under a CU. Thus, we combine the incentives of non-member countries and member countries. Before proceeding, note that while the membership e¤ ect and the cost e¤ ect arise under the formation of both FTAs and CUs, the nature of these e¤ects is quite di¤erent.
On one hand, the two factors together imply that the direction of the membership e¤ect under a CU is the opposite to that under an FTA: (i) the common external tari¤ under a CU is higher than the individual external tari¤ under an FTA and (ii) unlike an FTA, the defection of CUs from multilateral cooperation involves both members. As before, in order to isolate the membership e¤ect, we assume that cost e¤ect does not exists (c = 0). We show that, when countries are completely symmetric, the bene…t from defection for members (countries i and j) is higher while their cost of defection is lower relative to non-members:
Thus, opposite to FTAs, member countries are less willing to cooperate relative to non-member countries under complete symmetry: ij z < ij i = ij j , where z 6 = i; j and c = 0. In other words, the membership e¤ect acts in the reverse direction under the formation of a CU relative to an FTA.
On the other hand, the joint determination of external tari¤s has an important implication on the cost e¤ ect for asymmetric member countries (such as fns u g): while the bene…t and cost of the north member country is larger relative to that of the south member country under fns u g as under fnsg, the di¤erence in costs of defection dominates the di¤erence in bene…ts from defection under fns u g unlike fnsg. Thus, the north member country is less willing to cooperate relative to the south member country under fns u g: ns u n > ns u s . The nature of the cost e¤ ect for non-member countries under a bilateral CU remains the same as that under bilateral FTAs.
In the light of the above discussion it is immediate that the membership e¤ect and the cost e¤ect reinforce each other under hfss 0u gi and thus the south member countries'incentive is binding for the sustainability of multilateral cooperation under fss 0u g: ss 0u s > ss 0u n (represented by Figure  5a) :
Proposition 9a Under fss 0u g, multilateral cooperation over free trade is sustainable if and only if > ss 0u s .
[Insert Figure 5a ]
Similarly, we show that the north member country's incentive determines the critical discount factor under fns u g (see Figure 5b) :
Proposition 9b Under fns u g, multilateral cooperation over free trade is sustainable if and only if ns u n .
[Insert Figure 5b ]
Consider now fnn 0u g where the membership e¤ect and the cost e¤ect work in opposite directions. We show that, when the south non-member countries are su¢ ciently high cost, the latter e¤ect dominates the former and thus the south non-member countries'incentive binds for the multilateral cooperation over free trade: nn 0u s nn 0u n i¤ c c nn 0u . Therefore, the following is immediate (see Insert Figure 5c Next, using the above three propositions, we obtain one of our main results that compares the critical discount factors under di¤erent types of CUs.
Proposition 10 The range of discount factors above which multilateral cooperation over free trade is sustainable is the largest under fnn 0u g and the smallest under fss 0u g: ss 0u s ns u n max( nn 0u s ; nn 0u n ), where equality obtains only when c = 0. The above proposition argues that the critical discount factors under di¤erent CUs follow a reverse ranking to that of aggregate world welfare. Speci…cally, fnn 0u g not only yields the highest aggregate world welfare but also multilateral cooperation over free trade is more likely to be sustainable under fnn 0u g relative to other CUs. Note that, when the degree of cost asymmetry across countries is not very large, this result provides a sharp contrast to Proposition 6. Under such a case, in terms of sustaining cooperation, while hfnn 0u gi serves as the best agreement among bilateral CUs, fnn 0 g is the worst agreement among bilateral FTAs.
Comparison of CUs with no Agreement
Does the formation of CUs hamper or facilitate multilateral cooperation relative to no agreement? To address this question, …rst note that the membership e¤ ect and the cost e¤ ect reinforce each other under hfss 0u gi so that multilateral cooperation is harder to sustain under fss 0u g relative to f g: ss 0u s > s for all c. While the membership e¤ect and cost e¤ect work in opposite directions under fns u g, the former e¤ect dominates the latter and the following obtains: ns u n > s for all c. Finally, consider fnn 0u g which is the best possible CU in sustaining multilateral cooperation. We …nd that, when south countries are su¢ ciently high cost, the formation of fnn 0u g facilitates multilateral cooperation relative to f g: s max( nn 0u s ; nn 0u n ) i¤ c c(nn 0u ) holds. To understand this result, …rst note that c(nn 0u ) < c nn 0u holds. Therefore, we have to consider three distinct cost ranges: )), the cost e¤ ect for south countries under f g is small and dominated by the membership e¤ ect for the north member under fnn 0u g. The opposite obtains when c exceeds the critical threshold, i.e. when c > c(nn 0u ) holds. Finally, part (iii) is an immediate implication of Proposition 4. We summarize these …ndings below.
Proposition 11 While multilateral cooperation over free trade is always easier to sustain under f g relative to fns u g and fss 0u g, it is harder to sustain under f g relative to fnn 0u g when c c(nn 0u ) holds.
[Insert Figure 6 ] Proposition 7 and Proposition 11 together imply that how the formation of PTAs a¤ects multilateral cooperation over free trade depends on (i) whether a bilateral PTA is in the form of an FTA or a CU; (ii) the type of an FTA and a CU and (iii) the degree of cost asymmetry. Speci…cally, while a North-South PTA (FTA or CU) unambiguously hampers the obtainment of multilateral free trade, whether the formation of North-North and South-South PTAs facilitates the obtainment of free trade is ambiguous depending on the form of a PTA and the degree of cost asymmetry across regions.
Next, we consider a scenario in which we allow two bilateral PTAs.
Cooperation under two bilateral PTAs
Allowing for the formation of two bilateral PTAs yields two distinct trade agreement networks: (i) an inter-regional PTA network: two North-South PTAs (denoted by fns; n 0 s 0 g if agreements are in the form of FTAs and fns u ; n 0 s 0u g if they are CUs) and (ii) an intra-regional PTA network: North-North and South-South PTAs (denoted by fnn 0 ; ss 0 g if agreements are in the form of FTAs and fnn 0u ; ss 0u g if they are CUs). First, we consider a static game and examine the following questions: Do non-member countries under an existing PTA have incentives to form an additional PTA? What are the welfare implications of an additional PTA on the members of the other PTA and world as a whole? Proposition 12 Suppose there exist already a bilateral PTA. Then, the following results hold: (i) non-member countries under an existing PTA always have incentives to form a bilateral PTA with each other; (ii) while the formation of an additional PTA always raises the world welfare, it raises (lowers) the welfare of the member countries of the existing PTA if it is in the form of an FTA (a CU) and (iii) two inter-regional PTAs lead to higher world welfare relative to two intra-regional PTAs.
Due to market segmentation, it is immediate that the intuition underlying the …rst two parts of the above proposition is the same as the one that underlies Proposition 2. The last part of the proposition argues in favor of the idea that, since trade creation is larger under inter-regional PTAs while trade diversion is smaller relative to intra-regional PTAs, the former regime welfare-dominates the polarization of the world trade regime with two intra-regional PTAs. Which of these regimes helps for the cause of multilateral cooperation over free trade? Hereafter, to conserve space, we directly state our main results and prove them in the appendix:
Proposition n obtains under CUs. The joint determination of common external tari¤s under CU yields that even though the bene…ts and costs are larger for the north member countries under fns u ; n 0 s 0u g relative to south member countries, the ratio of cost of defection and bene…t from defection is the same and thus the same critical discount factors obtain: ns u ;n 0 s 0u s = ns u ;n 0 s 0u n = 2 3 . Unlike CUs, FTA members impose their external tari¤s independently and the ratio of cost of defection to bene…t from defection under fns; n 0 s 0 g is smaller for the south member countries relative to north ones. Therefore, south member countries' incentives bind for the sustainability of cooperation under fns; n 0 s 0 g. More importantly, the above propositions along with Figures 7a and 7b imply that the polarization of the world trade system via intra-regional PTAs not only reduces world welfare but also makes free trade less likely to be sustainable via multilateral cooperation relative to inter-regional PTAs.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have considered how the formation of PTAs among cost-asymmetric North and South countries impacts non-member countries, world welfare and the sustainability of multilateral of free trade. By utilizing a four-country setup with multiple high cost and low cost countries, we were able to di¤erentiate the roles of both cost (high versus low) and membership (member versus non-member) in bilateral FTAs and CUs, and for the prospects of global free trade. In our framework, the cost e¤ ect served to make high cost countries less willing to participate in multilateral free trade, independently of whether they were initially part of an FTA or a CU or a non-member. The feasibility of free trade then hinged upon the membership e¤ ect, as in some countries it worked in the same direction as the cost e¤ect while in other countries it worked in the opposite direction.
In the static model, our model exhibits some common concerns regarding South-South agreements, particularly that these arrangements lead to higher levels of protection and lower welfare than North-North and North-South agreements. This result is more prominent when the initial PTA is a customs union than when it is a FTA. However, in terms of sustainability, we …nd certain cases where South-South agreements are more likely to lead to global free trade than North-North or North-South agreements. However, this is not always the case. For example, considering only CUs, South-South agreements are the least likely to result in free trade. In this way, we have shown that both the type of agreement (CU versus FTA) and the extent of cost variation between the North and South are critical in the evaluation of whether South-South trade agreements are bene…cial or harmful for the prospects of global free trade.
Appendix
In this Appendix we provide the necessary supporting calculations and proofs.
Tari¤ and welfare levels
We begin by reporting welfare levels under di¤erent policy regimes as a function of tari¤s and then derive optimum tari¤s. Using the welfare and tari¤ levels reported below, we can easily obtain the formulae for optimum welfare levels under all possible regimes.
No where r = hfnn 0 gi, hfnn 0u gi and ; t ns u s 0 = 9 7c 33 Inter-regional PTA network : r = fns; n 0 s 0 g if it is an FTA and fns u ; n 0 s 0u g if it is a CU. Then, we have The proofs of Proposition 1, Proposition 2, Proposition 12 and the inequalities in (16) and (17) are immediate using the optimum tari¤s and welfare levels reported above.
Critical Cost Thresholds
No Agreement Based on these threshold cost levels, the market access of south …rms under any FTA is guaranteed if c c f = 3 19 holds. Customs Unions x sn (ss 0u ) = x sn 0 (ss 0u ) = x sn (n 0 s 0u ) = 3 19c 33 0 i¤ c 3 19 x sn (nn 0u ) = x sn (nn 0u ; ss 0u ) = 9c 20 0 i¤ c 9 x sn 0 (n 0 s 0u ) = x ss 0 (n 0 s 0 ) = x sn 0 (ns u ; n 0 s 0u ) = x ss 0 (ns u ; n 0 s 0u ) = 2 21c 40 0 i¤ c 2
21
Based on these threshold cost levels, the market access of south …rms under any CU is guaranteed if c c u = 2 21 holds. Note that c f < c u . In (17), c ns s = 0:086 < c u .
